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Introduction
This paper quanties the contribution of changes in the composition of the workforce to the rise of wage inequality in Canada between 1980 and 2010. Several recent studies have documented a signicant rise in inequality over that period. For instance, the Gini coecient of market income estimated on the basis of survey data has risen by 18% between 1976 and 2009 (Figure 1, Fortin et al., 2012 . Using tax data, Veall (2012) nds that the income share of the top 1% has increased from 8% to 12% between 1980 and 2010. Although the observable characteristics of the Canadian labour force have changed signicantly in the last 30 years, to the best of our knowledge, no study has attempted to determine if composition changes have had a meaningful role in the rise of inequality.
Composition eects can increase inequality in at least two ways. Firstly, a rise in the dispersion of observable characteristics increases the inequality of wages, unless there is a corresponding fall in skill dierentials. In 1980, 58% of full-time workers had a high school degree or less and only 13% had a college degree. By contrast, the majority of workers in 2005 had some education beyond high school, and there were approximately as many workers with a college degree (24.2%) as workers with only a high school degree (24.6%). Since the return to education has remained high (and has even increased between 1980 and 2005 Boudarbat et al. (2010) ), this higher dispersion of educational attainments should explain part of the increase in inequality.
Secondly, composition eects may increase the demographic weight of worker categories with higher within-group inequality. Lemieux (2006) nds that within-group inequality is systematically higher among educated and experienced workers in the US. Furthermore, average years of schooling and experience in the US labour force have increased substantially between 1973 and 2003. The resulting composition eects explain between 28% and 75% of the rise in residual inequality 1 among American women (between 44% and 70% among men) (Tables 1A and 1B , Lemieux, 2006) . Since similar demographic changes have occured in Canada, composition shifts towards skill groups with higher within-group inequality should have aected inequality in Canada as well.
In order to quantify the importance of these two mechanisms, we use condential data 2 with a new sample available every 5 years. We use hourly compensation to measure inequality and restrict our sample to full-time workers. Measurement issues arise in the construction of our data since the Census does not measure hourly compensation directly. In Section 2, we argue that census data measure hourly compensation adequately for full-time workers and that our restricted sample yields valuable insights about the evolution of inequality.
The National Household Survey contains the same information as previous censuses, and has a large sample size as well : the main dierence is that the NHS is not compulsory, and thus vulnerable to non-response bias. In spite of this caveat, the results we obtain from NHS data are consistent with other data sources, and our conclusions remain the same whether we use the 2006 census or the 2011 NHS as the last year of our analysis.
We dene composition as a vector of four characteristics : education, experience, gender and immigrant status. Using a simple variance decomposition, we nd that between 73% and 87% of the rise in inequality can be explained by a dramatic expansion of within-group variances. The increase of within-group variances is itself driven by the rapid growth of hourly compensation in the top percentiles, as shown in Figure 1 . Composition eects and changes in the returns to various measures of skill play only a small role in the rise of total inequality. Conterfactual scenarios based on the DFL method (DiNardo et al., 1996) conrm that composition eects do not fully account for the rise of top wages.
However, composition eects have had an important impact on the evolution of average hourly compensation over the period. Average hourly compensation grew by 15.5 percent in our sample between 1980 and 2010, well behind the 39.8 percent growth of GDP per hour worked. This weak performance masks an even more sluggish (sometimes negative) growth within skill groups. When holding the composition of the workforce constant, we nd that average hourly compensation falls by 1% to 8% during the period.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the population we study, addresses issues related to the National Household Survey, and explains how we calculate hourly compensation. Section 3 shows the evolution of hourly compensation by education, gender, immigrant status and potential experience. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. Starting with the 2011 census, the long form was abolished, a move that sparked controversy (Green and Milligan, 2010; Veall, 2010 In order to measure hourly compensation as accurately as possible, we focus on workers who meet the following criteria :
• Workers must have worked 30 hours or more during the reference week of year t • Workers must have worked at least 40 weeks in year t -1.
• Most of these weeks must have been worked full-time.
We refer to workers who meet these criteria as full-time workers. Our criteria induce truncation bias, most importantly by excluding low earners who move in and out of the labour market. However, our procedure is likely to preserve high income earners such as medical doctors or senior managers, who work full-time and are unlikely to suer long spells of unemployment. 40 to 52 weeks full-time in t -1 45.0% 88.3% Table 2 : Work activity and conditional probability of working full-time in the reference week, respondents aged 15 and above, 2010-2011 population Table 2 shows the distribution of work activity of all respondents aged 15 and above in the NHS. Workers who have worked mostly full-time for 40 weeks or more during year t -1 are more likely to work full-time during the reference week of year t by a wide margin. We censor hours at 84 (7 × 12). 40 to 52 weeks full-time in t -1 64.6% 89.9% Table 3 : Work activity and conditional probability of working full-time in the reference week, respondents aged 25 to 54, 2010-2011 population
We use the sum of wages, self-employment income and income from a non-incorporated farm business as our measure of employment income. The question concerning hours worked in the census includes hours worked in one's own business. Our choice of employment income thus ensures that both the numerator and the denominator of hourly compensation refer to the same concept of work. In our study, we use the terms hourly compensation and hourly wage interchangeably since "wages" include self-employment income. Dollar amounts are in 2010 dollars, unless stated otherwise. We use the national CPI (CANSIM Table 326-0021) to convert nominal wages into 2010 dollars.
Since some non-incorporated businesses incur losses during the year, respondents might have a negative hourly compensation. This poses no problem when the results are presented in levels. However, negative values preclude the use of the logarithm function. Therefore, all of our decompositions based on the log of wages exclude values below 1$ per hour. In part B of the Online appendix, we show that excluding negative wages has little impact on the growth and level of inequality.
We also show in part C of the Online appendix that the ratio of employment income to total income is fairly stable through time, even when the ratio is broken down by income percentile. In particular, this ratio increases little in the top percentiles. Therefore, the rise based on the Labour Force Survey.
The 1 st percentile is not shown in Table 4 since it remains stable at zero. Respondents who work for a family business without formal arrangements might report zero income but sucient hours to be included in our sample. We show in sections B and E of the Online appendix that rising inequality in our sample is driven by increasing compensation at the top rather than negative or zero values. In particular, when the observations above the 99.9 th percentile are removed, the growth of the coecient of variation between 1980 and 2010 falls from 90% to 32%. Real GDP per hour obtained from FRED, serie CANRGDPH.
In order to put the values of Table 4 into context, Figure 2 compares the evolution of hourly compensation to the evolution of average labour productivity, as measured by real GDP per hour worked. The cumulative percentage growth is normalized to start at 0. Three facts stand out from Figure 2 . Firstly, the 50 th , 90 th and 99 th percentiles moved roughly in tandem until 1995, when the 99 th percentile began to grow much more rapidly than the 90 th . Secondly, the cumulative growth of the 99 th percentile over the period is roughly equal to labour productivity growth : even those workers located at the 99 th percentile barely kept pace with productivity growth. Finally, the 99.9 th percentile grew at the same rate as productivity until 1995, before increasing dramatically and falling slightly after the great recession of 2008. 6 suggest that rising educational attainments have compensated for sluggish wage growth within skill groups. Table 7 shows the evolution of the coecient of variation of hourly compensation. Inequality growth was substantial within each group but was highest among college educated workers. The coecient of variation does not increase monotonically with education, but rather seems to have a U-shaped relation, a nding that diers from studies based on US data (Lemieux, 2006) 3 . This might be caused by higher measurement error among full-time workers with less education, especially if their labour supply varies more over time.
2 The CEGEP is an institution specic to Quebec. Students can earn either a terminal 3-year diploma that is the equivalent of an associate degree, or a 2-year degree which typically leads to undergraduate studies.
3 Strictly speaking, Lemieux (2006) uses the log of wages. Calculating the variance of the log with Canadian data yields the same U-shaped relation as the coecient of variation. We dene potential experience as Exp = Age − Years of schooling − 6 . Since the 2006 census and the NHS do not measure years of schooling, we allocate them based on the highest degree completed and demographic characteristics. Part D of the Online appendix details the procedure. Table 8 shows the evolution of potential experience in our sample. Almost 27% of full-time workers are part of the category with 20-29 years of experience in 2010, up from 19.4% in 1980. On the other hand, the 0-9 category underwent a 10% decline over the same period. Table 9 shows that average compensation grew in every category between 1980 and 2010.
Interesingly, hourly compensation growth was fastest in the categories that also experienced the biggest increase in demographic weight. In particular, growth in the 20-29 category was faster than average compensation growth among all full-time workers. The interaction of this trend and population aging explains a signicant proportion of compensation growth between 1980 and 2010. This pattern diers from the trends in Tables 5 and 6, where rising educational attainments oset stagnating wages within each category. Note that the unconditional wage gap between younger and older workers has expanded over the period. Finally, Table 10 shows that within-group inequality increases monotically with experience, in agreement with a model of human capital accumulumation in which workers invest in on-the-job training at diering rates (Mincer, 1974 Table 11 shows that the proportion of women among full-time workers rose from 31.4% in 1980 to 42.6% in 2010. Since women have lower wages than men, as shown in Table 12 , their entry in the labour market can increase between-group inequality. On the other hand, Table 12 also shows that inequality is lower among women and grew more slowly for them during the period, reducing the growth of residual inequality. Since residual inequality is the biggest component of total inequality, the increased labour force participation of women is likely to have curbed the growth of the variance of wages. Lemieux and Riddell (2015) nd that men represented 81.2% of the top 1% in 2005, an explanation for why within-group inequality is much lower among women. The share of immigrants in the full-time workforce rose slightly between 1980 and 2010, from 21.1% to 23.3%. Table 13 shows a reversal in the relative position of natives and immigrants : starting in 1995, hourly compensation becomes higher for natives than for immigrants. This reversal can be explained by other observable characteristics : for instance, native Canadians are aging faster than immigrants and earn higher wages as a result of their higher experience. Boudarbat and Lemieux (2014) also nd that immigrants now get lower returns on their education and are increasingly penalized if their language skills are lacking. Table 13 shows that inequality grew faster among immigrants. This trend is consistent with the sharp decline that occured at the bottom of the wage distribution of immigrants, another fact documented in Boudarbat and Lemieux (2014) .
Results

Variance decomposition
The following is true for any pair of random variables :
If Y in equation (1) measures income and X are observable characteristics, the rst term on the right-hand side corresponds to residual inequality and the second term, to between-group inequality. We use this formula to compute the respective contributions of residual and between-group inequality to the evolution of V ar[Y ] between two periods :
X t denotes the distribution of observable characteristics at time t, and Y t |X the conditional distribution of wages at time t for a given vector of characteristics. For instance, E Xt V ar[Y s |X] is the mean of the within-group variances at time s, weighted by the shares of the groups at time t. Finally, we divide each of the right-hand-side components into a composition and a structural eect: To compute the decomposition, we drop every observation with hourly compensation below 1$ and use the log of wages in order to remove the eect of a changing mean on the variance. Respondents are allocated to a cell that corresponds to their gender, immigrant status, potential experience and education categories (the categories used are the same as in Section 3). As foreshadowed by Section 3, (I), the component linked to within-group variances is the dominant factor. Composition eects account for only 7.7%/84.5% = 9.1% of the increase in residual inequality. Since wage inequality is much lower among women in the wage structure of 2006, the entry of women in the labour force over the period osets the impact of rising educational attainments and experience levels on residual inequality. (III) is quantitatively important because the wages of dropouts and younger workers fell substantially between 1981 and 2006. The wage gap between natives and immigrants, which was mostly absent in 1981, expanded substantially over the period, also contributing to the between-group, structural component. Table 15 shows that using the wage structure of 2011 generates roughly the same results. Table 16 shows the same decomposition using the wage structure of 1981 (s = 1981, t = 2006) . The wage structure in 1981 showed much less heteroscedasticity, which explains why composition eects play no role in the rise of residual inequality. Again, the biggest contribution comes from a dramatic rise in within-group variances, and using either 2011 or 2006 as the endpoint does not aect the results. Since more women were part of the labour force in 2006/2011 than in 1981, paying 2006/2011 
for each skill group i. Since we have grouped workers into a number of mutually exclusive cells, the computation of Ψ i is trivial :
Equation 4 is a particular case of the DFL (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996) method.
Using this formula, we compute selected counterfactual percentiles of the wage distribution, Table 18 provides the intuition behind this result. If we look at the 99 th percentile by education group, we see that the rapid increase of top wages essentially happened among full-time workers with a bachelor's degree or above. When the skill distribution of 1981 is used, the categories that generate much of the rise in top incomes are under-represented in the data.
Since workers in 1981 were half as likely as 2006 workers to hold a college degree, the eect of the resulting dierence is quite important. However, when the composition of 2011 is used, the counterfactual and actual 99.9 th percentiles move in tandem, indicating that composition eects begin to lose their explanatory power at this level in the wage distribution.
In summary, composition eects account for a diminishing but still substantial part of hourly compensation growth as we look towards higher percentiles. In particular, they explain a large proportion of the growth of the 90 th and the 99 th percentile, a fact not visible from the variance decompositions. Section 4.1 showed that composition eects explain a relatively small portion of the rise in inequality; this section shows that this is because they do not explain the rise of very high wages. The substantial growth of within-group variances appears indeed to be caused by the growth in compensation among the top wages (mostly the top 0.1%), the change in the rest of the distribution being largely explained by variations in observable characteristics. 1. Wages within educational and potential experience groups have stagnated between 1980 and 2010.
2. Hourly compensation growth among full-time workers is driven largely by the aging of the workforce and by rising educational attainments. Once we remove the wage eects of changes in the composition of the labor force (the so-called composition eects), average hourly compensation falls by 1% to 8% over the period.
3. The aging of the workforce and the concomitant growth of potential experience has oset to a certain extent slow wage growth within skill groups, but this aging eect has arguably run its course.
4. Between 75% and 85% of the increase in wage inequality between 1980 and 2010 is explained by the increase of within-skill-groups inequality, that is, by other factors than composition eects or rising skill dierentials.
5. The growth of percentiles up to the 99 th is mostly driven by changes in the composition of the workforce.
6. An immediate corollary of (4) and (5) is that the growth of within-group variances, the most important factor in the growth of inequality, must be caused by the growth of percentiles higher than the 99 th . Section 4.2 shows that composition eects do not account for the rise of wages in the top 0.1% of the distribution.
7. Section E of the Online appendix shows that the growth of inequality between 1980 and 2010 falls from 90% to 32% when the observations in the top 0.1% are removed, conrming our intuition that these observations drive the growth of inequality.
More generally, the slow growth of wages within skill groups appears to be caused by deep macroeconomic trends. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) nd that the labour share of income is decreasing in most countries and industries since 1980, and that half of that decline is caused by a fall in the relative price of investment goods. The fact that the decline of the labour share is a worldwide phenomenon suggests that slow wage growth (relative to output) is not caused by circumstances specic to Canada, and that further research is needed to pin down the exact forces behind the decline of the labour share of income.
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Online appendix
The online appendic is hosted at the following address :
http 
